Chapter 11
Nishida and Ueda on Philosophical Reflection

Yuko Ishihara

Abbreviation

USS Ueda, Shizuteru. 2001–2003. *Ueda Shizuteru shū* 上田閑照集 [*Collected Works of Ueda Shizuteru*], 11 volumes. Tokyo: Iwanami.

1 Introduction

So long as philosophy is a reflective endeavor, articulating the nature of philosophical reflection is crucial for understanding any philosophical position. Such a task is all the more important for Nishida since his philosophy is too often neglected or dismissed on the grounds that it is "too religious" or "too speculative," not just by western critics, but also by fellow Japanese scholars. In their remarks, they often imply that Nishida downplays the role of reflection in philosophical discourse and appeals to non-reflective religious experience instead. While such dismissal is ultimately based on a misunderstanding, it is also not completely unfounded. The basic idea underlying the entirety of Nishida's philosophy is that the ground of reality, whether "pure experience" or "absolute nothingness," is the selfless experience revealed not by any kind of reflection, but through the "rupture of reflection" (*hansei no yabure* 反省の破れ), as Ueda Shizuteru 上田閑照 puts it. Accordingly, the question naturally arises as to how one can articulate such a ground *through* reflection. If Nishida is committed to the task of philosophically articulating his position, which he evidently was, then it is worth pursuing an answer to this crucial question.

Y. Ishihara (✉)
College of Global Liberal Arts, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan

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Unfortunately, Nishida was not so forthcoming when it came to explaining the nature of philosophical reflection in his thinking. In fact, the problem of reflection, and specifically philosophical reflection, has a peculiar place in Nishida's philosophy. On the one hand, to the extent that he hardly thematizes philosophical reflection (*tetsugakuteki hansei* 哲学的反省) as such in his writings, it seems that it was not so much of a problem. On the other hand, on many occasions, he speaks of the "standpoint of philosophy" (*tetsugaku no tachiba* 哲学の立場) in contradistinction to other standpoints such as the "standpoint of religion" (*shūkyō no tachiba* 宗教の立場). In so doing, he was calling attention to the question of how the reflective method in philosophy differs from various religious and other methods. Additionally, although philosophical reflection in the sense of *tetsugakuteki hansei* is not highlighted in his writings, *jikaku* (自覚) is a central concept and topic for Nishida. While *jikaku* is often translated as "self-awareness", for Nishida it refers to the specific way in which one becomes aware of oneself reflectively in the place one finds oneself. The meaning of *jikaku* in ordinary usage already has such connotations, as for example when one says "*hahaoya toshiteno jikaku o motsu* (母親としての自覚を持つ)" meaning, "I become aware of myself as a mother." Here "*jikaku* as a mother" connotes a self-understanding of oneself as a mother gained through one's engagement with the social and cultural context to which one belongs. Such self-understanding is not purely theoretical but involves the way one comports oneself in the world. Curiously, Nishida does not elaborate on a philosophical kind of *jikaku* or "*tetsugakusha toshiteno jikaku* (哲学者としての自覚)*"* (*jikaku* as a philosopher). But, judging from how central this concept was for him, it is natural to assume that a philosophical *jikaku* is operative throughout his writings.

Picking up on this last point, Ueda Shizuteru has provided an account of philosophical reflection *vis-à-vis jikaku* in the context of articulating how it figures in Nishida's philosophy. His account is extremely insightful in that it clarifies how Nishida's conception of philosophical reflection differs from the more traditional sort found in the history of western philosophy. As a matter of fact, I believe that Ueda offers an account of philosophical reflection that could be understood as a radicalized form of *transcendental reflection*. While Ueda himself does not express his idea in this way, such an interpretation will allow us to resituate Nishida's thought within the history of western philosophy, specifically in relation to the transcendental tradition. Upon doing so, we will be able to clear up some of the misunderstandings regarding the status of reflection in Nishida's philosophy.

In the following, I first present Ueda's account of philosophical reflection as it figures in Nishida's philosophy. While Ueda articulates this as an interpretation of Nishida, I present it as characteristic of Ueda's own positive account of philosophical reflection. I then proceed to argue that their mutual account of philosophical reflection is a radicalized form of transcendental reflection. In doing so, I also clarify what is truly unique about Nishida's and Ueda's conceptions of philosophical reflection. In Conclusion, I return to the ordinary Japanese usage of *jikaku* and ask what the nature of *jikaku* for the philosopher is.

2 Two Models of Reflection

Let us begin with the two models of reflection that Ueda offers, which he calls "small turn reflection" (*komawari no tanhansei* 小廻りの短反省) and "big turn reflection" (*ōmawari no hansei* 大廻りの反省) (1994: 103–104; 108–113). According to Ueda, while the former kind of reflection is prevalent in the western philosophical tradition, Nishida's idea of *jikaku*, usually translated as "self-awareness" or "self-consciousness," is exemplary of the latter.[1] Although Nishida himself does not make this distinction, it nicely highlights the uniqueness of his idea of *jikaku*.

As a starting point, Ueda takes a very simple example that Nishida himself had originally invoked in his earlier writings: the experience of seeing a flower.[2] What is the nature of this experience before we reflect and take a stance on it? Can we identify some sort of "I" or "self" at the heart of the experience? According to Ueda, the Buddhist tradition denies that there is such a self while the western philosophical tradition argues otherwise. Modern western common sense sides with the latter. We usually think that in our own experience of looking at a flower, there is an "I", however implicit it may be, which is looking at the flower. Indeed, such a subject-object scheme is prevalent in one's experience. Whether it is the experience of brushing our teeth in the morning or thinking about complex mathematical equations, we tend to believe that there is an "I" that is doing the brushing or the thinking. Yet, Ueda questions this common belief:

> But is it really the case that from the very start, the subject "I" is seeing an object? [...] Is there really an "I" in the beginning? Is it not the case that there is the pure state of affairs or the presence [*genzen,* 現前] of the appearing of the flower (the pure presence prior to the determination of it as 'flower')? (Ueda 1994: 100)[3]

It is interesting that after posing this question, Ueda does not proceed to argue, as one may expect, that there is no self in such experience. Rather, he brackets this very question. He begins his analysis instead with the relatively uncontroversial point: *when I reflect on the experience, I become aware of the "I" that is reflecting on the experience.* Although it is difficult if not impossible to "verify" (*tashikameru* 確かめる) which view is correct, as Ueda says, "[w]hat is certain (*tashikanakoto* 確かなこと) is that when I say that 'I am looking at the mountain,' there is an 'I' that is saying that 'I am looking at the mountain'" (Ueda 2000: 166). Rather than

[1] I am presenting the general outline of Ueda's discussion in two of his works from 1994 (Ueda 1994: 98–119) and 2000 (Ueda 2000: 165–170).

[2] Nishida raises this example in his early, posthumously published writing, "Fragmentary Notes on Pure Experience" (*junsuikeiken ni kansurudanshō* 純粋経験に関する断章). Though the exact years in which these notes were written are unknown, they were supposedly composed around the time *An Inquiry into the Good* was originally published in 1911. Cf. Nishida (1980: 267–572). See also the afterword written by Tokuryū Yamauchi (*Nishida Kitarō Zenshū,* Vol. 16, 673–674). In Ueda's work from 2000, he employs a different example of the experience of looking at a mountain but the idea remains the same.

[3] Cf. Ueda (2000: 165–166). All Ueda citations are my translations.

speculating about the nature of our pre-reflective experience, he begins with our experience as it has already entered the arena of reflection. What happens upon reflection is that the reflective "I" goes back to the initial, pre-reflective experience and interprets it as *my* experience, namely that "*I* am looking at *the mountain*."

At this point, Ueda describes two directions our thinking can take. On the one hand, one can think of this whole experience from the perspective of the reflecting "I" and interpret pre-reflective experience of seeing the flower as constituted by the higher-order "I," *without which there would be no experience to begin with*. According to this view, the "I" is the condition of possibility of experience. Through reflection, we come to see that our initial experience of seeing the flower is *only* possible on the basis of its constitution by the "I." Ueda sees the culmination of this way of thinking in the idea of transcendental subjectivity (Ueda 2000: 167). According to this view, reflection *articulates* the "I" that is allegedly only implicit in pre-reflective experience. Put differently, reflection is a way of *bringing out* the pre-reflective self.

On the other hand, the other direction seeks to *eliminate* the pre-reflective self. This view also acknowledges that, when we reflect on our initial experience, we come to see that the reflective 'I' constitutes the experience. But instead of then interpreting the initial experience as that which is only possible on the basis of the "I," the initial experience is understood as the "original experience" (*genkeiken* 原経験) from which the "I" arises in the first place (together with the constituted experience). Here, Ueda emphasizes that it is *not* the case that we come to interpret the initial experience in this way upon reflection. One cannot reflectively come to see the initial experience as the original experience whereby the "I" is totally absent. Such theoretical thinking is alien to the matter at hand. Rather, it is something that can only be directly revealed through one's experience. In the original experience, one simply apprehends oneself as completely nullified and selfless. As Ueda says: "[s]uch original experience is given in a 'selfless' manner […] through the breaking down of the subject ('I') into nothingness" (Ueda 2000: 167). He also calls such experience *kaku* (覚) meaning "awakening" or "realization" (Ueda 2000: 146; see also 1991: 250).[4] As this word suggests, this is a kind of religious experience. But it is not something so inaccessible or extraordinary either. As a typical case of such awakened experience, Ueda refers to Nishida's description of "pure experience" from the opening to *An Inquiry into the Good* (hereafter, *Inquiry*): "[i]n 'the moment of seeing a color, hearing a sound,' the subject-object frame that was closing off consciousness breaks opens into the clearing. This is "awakening" [覚]" (Ueda 1991: 250).[5]

We all have experience of losing the self when completely absorbed in a beautiful piece of music, for example. While this is a beautiful experience, there is nothing specifically religious about it. To be sure, most of the time, these are simply

[4] Ueda specifically describes such *kaku* as the awakening to one's true mode of being in the clearing (Ueda 1991: 372).

[5] The original reads: 「『色を見、音を聞く刹那』、意識を閉ざしていた主客の枠が破れ、開けに開かれます。これが『覚』です。」.

momentary experiences. But they can also have lasting transformative effects. When they are powerful enough to pull us out of our usual way of understanding ourselves as mostly self-enclosed and self-sustaining, then such events become awakened experiences. Importantly, it is *not* that we bring about those awakened experiences by giving them more reflective thought. In fact, no effort on our part can really bring about such experiences. Rather, it is the experience itself that pulls us out of our ordinary views of ourselves and reveals that we are nothing but reality actualizing itself, i.e., that we are selfless. I did not awaken myself but the experience awoke me. It is literally an awakened experience since it radically challenges and overturns our ordinary understanding of ourselves, i.e., it awakens us from our dogma. In such experience, we are sometimes led to say, "I am the music, and the music is me." This is the way Nishida speaks in his "Fragmentary Notes on Pure Experience," where he provides the following simple yet powerful description of pure experience: "I am looking at the flower At this moment, the flower is me and I am the flower" (Nishida 1980: 430). Of course, such remarks make little or only metaphorical sense when we take ourselves to be self-enclosed and self-sufficient. Usually, I have the firm belief that "I am I", which in turn implies that I am *not* the flower and that the flower is *not* myself. Yet, when the selfless experience pulls us out of our ordinary ways of thinking and we are part of reality realizing itself, one naturally resorts to such ways of speaking. This allows us to see that the way we usually think of ourselves and reality is in fact a tainted view.

It cannot be overemphasized that selfless experience cannot be brought about through reflection. This is simply because reflection is necessarily bifurcating, i.e., it gives rise to the division between the reflecting I and reflected experience, however subtle the division may be. Yet, since selfless experience sees no such division at all, by its very nature, reflection cannot reveal it. Put differently, no reflection, however high-order it may be, can do the job of eliminating the "I". As Ueda writes, "[t]he pre-reflective becomes the original givenness, *not through reflection*, but by way of the rupture of reflection [*hansei no yabure,* 反省の破れ]" (Ueda 1994: 178 [emphasis added]).

According to Ueda's view, reflection takes the following form: At first, there is the selfless presence of "the flower." This is the experience of *kaku* or awakening. Ueda describes this as "presencing to the presence" (*genzen e no genzai* 現前への現在) (Ueda 1994: 102). If someone were to ask *what* is being presented here, one cannot fully characterize the event since there is nothing that is determined. There is neither a determining subject nor a determined object. Only upon "coming back" to oneself in reflection, can one say "I am seeing the flower." We must, of course, be careful with such a way of speaking since we do not want to suggest that there was originally a self that we only later came back to in reflection. It is only upon reflection that the subject-object dichotomy, and accordingly the "I", arises for the first time. Ueda says that it is here that *ji-kaku* (note that *ji* means "self", thus, *jikaku* means "self-awakening") arises. This kind of reflection (namely, reflection *qua jikaku*) is quite different from the first view since *jikaku* arises with the awareness of its non-reflective origin in awakened experience. In such experience, the self is not there. And only in "coming back" to oneself in reflection, the self identifies with

itself. Yet, in doing so, it understands that the self is also selfless. Therefore, when the reflective I arises from the initial experience, it says: "the self is —*selflessly*— the self." Ueda calls this kind of reflection "big turn reflection" because the self turns back on itself through a moment of self-negation or selflessness. This is to be distinguished from the "small turn reflection" whereby the self comes back to itself without realizing this selfless moment.[6] This refers to the first kind of reflection mentioned above. According to Ueda, contrary to the latter version, this reflection says, "the self is the self" or "I am I."

At this point, let us take a moment to contemplate the idea of self-negation. What does it mean to say that the self is *selflessly* the self? How does it differ from the simple identification of the self with itself? Ueda tells us that this self-negation is "not merely formal." By this, he means that the role of negation makes a significant, qualitative difference in what is at stake. As Ueda says, it is "the expression of the fulfillment itself in the presencing to the presence" (Ueda 1994: 102). This idea of "fulfillment" (*jūjitsu* 充実) recurs in passages where Ueda describes selfless experience. Referring to Nishida's idea of pure experience, he says: "'[i]n the very moment of seeing a color, hearing a sound, there is not yet subject nor object.' In such experience, 'I' am infinitely open as the 'selfless' and fulfilled." And shortly after, he also says that it is "the direct fulfillment (*chokusetsuteki jūjitsu* 直接的充実) of experience" (Ueda 2000: 168). Such a description nicely captures the fullness and richness of selfless experience as well as the radical openness or emptiness of the self. Whereas the usual conception takes the self to be closed off upon itself, thereby implying self-sufficiency, this view takes the self as being essentially and radically disclosed to reality. Here, "reality" should not be taken to be something that is objectified or necessarily implying that it is grasped by a self. Such experience of reality would not be fulfilling in Ueda's sense of fulfillment. Rather, fulfillment occurs when the self is emptied of its various beliefs and desires that normally taint the perception of reality. In this way, selflessness or the emptiness of the self and the fullness and richness of the experience are two sides of the same coin: to be selfless *is* to be fulfilled by the fullness and richness of experience. Going back to my earlier example of being lost in the flow of music, the selfless encounter with the reality of the music certainly does not mean that I experience nothing. On the contrary, "I" experience "music" realizing itself fully.[7] Put differently, I am the very openness that allows the music to realize itself in its fullness without it being objectified as

[6] The expressions "short turn" and "long turn" are literal translations and intend to evoke the imagery of one's reflection making a shorter, smaller turn or a longer, wider turn back onto oneself. Ueda's idea is to distinguish between the direct way in which the self turns back onto itself ("short turn") and the indirect and roundabout way that the self turns back onto itself through a moment of self-negation ("long turn"). While it is not conventional to speak in English of a turn in reflection being "short" or "long", it should be noted that it is not natural to speak of reflection in these terms in Japanese either. I have kept the literal translations to alert the reader to the uniqueness of the imagery Ueda intends to evoke.

[7] Since it is somewhat inevitable to employ subject-object language in describing experience that is beyond it, I am here putting single quotation marks around the subject (I) and object (music) in the descriptions at the level of selfless experience.

something that is separate from me. In such experience, there is simply the "self-realization of reality itself," as Nishitani Keiji 西谷啓治, a student of Nishida's, would put it (Nishitani 1982: 5). It is worth noting that Nishitani is employing the twofold meaning of the English word "realize," namely "to actualize" and "to understand." When we say that "music realizes itself in us," on the one hand, it signifies the *actualization* of reality in us. On the other hand, it entails *our coming to an understanding*, or what Nishitani calls "appropriating through understanding," that the music is indeed actualizing itself in us. Accordingly, we can observe that the moment of self-negation in the formulation "the self is selflessly the self" entails a self-understanding through the actualization of reality. In other words, self-understanding is mediated by the disclosure of reality. This is contrary to the kind of self-understanding of the self that immediately comes back to itself. Thus, small turn reflection involves immediate self-understanding, while big turn reflection involves self-understanding mediated by the actualization of reality.

3 Philosophical *jikaku*

In the above section, we discussed two models of reflection, namely one that immediately returns to itself and another that returns to itself through the mediation of self-negation. Put differently, one model articulates the pre-reflective self and one eliminates it. Let us now focus on Ueda's description of *philosophical reflection*. Philosophical reflection is a specific kind of reflection insofar as it is a method employed in philosophical thinking. Broadly speaking —and putting aside all differences between the various philosophical tendencies— it is a higher-order reflection that attempts to reveal the underlying basis of knowledge or of reality itself. Ueda properly distinguishes the kind of reflection employed in our everyday lives from the higher-order *jikaku* employed in philosophy. For our purposes, let us call the latter, philosophical *jikaku*.

Ueda develops his view of philosophical reflection within the context of explicating Nishida's philosophical position in the *Inquiry*, namely the "standpoint of pure experience" (*junsuikeiken no tachiba* 純粋経験の立場). Nishida describes pure experience as our direct, undifferentiated experience of reality prior to the subject-object distinction. The aim of the *Inquiry* was to show that pure experience is the "sole reality" from which the rest of reality and experience is derived. As Nishida says in the Preface: "I would like to explain everything on the basis of pure experience as the sole reality" (Nishida 1978: 4; 1990: xxx).[8] But, if pure experience precedes conceptualization and reflection, how can one attempt to develop a philosophical position out of it? In fact, as soon as we start reflecting on and talking about pure experience, is that not already a deviation from pure experience? It appears that

[8] Whenever the English translation is available, I have given the pagination from the Japanese original first, followed by the English translation pagination.

there is a chasm between pure experience and experience as it is reflectively understood. Moreover, there seems to be a further chasm between the above two and the philosophical position that is based on pure experience.

Ueda accordingly parses Nishida's attempt to explain everything on the basis of pure experience as the sole reality, into three distinct levels: (A) Pure experience, (B) Pure experience is the sole reality, and (C) I would like to explain everything on the basis of pure experience as the sole reality. Ueda takes A as an event that is often observed in the Zen Buddhist tradition (Ueda 1991: 235–236). For example, a Zen monk called Reiun who was distressed with his practice is said to have reached enlightenment upon seeing peach blossoms in full bloom, namely in "the moment of seeing the color" (*reiuntōka* 霊雲桃花). Or another monk, Kyōgen, was sweeping the garden when a small stone hit one of the bamboo trees. With this sound (i.e. in "the moment of hearing the sound"), he is said to have grasped the way (*kyōgengekichiku* 香厳撃竹).

However, as Ueda rightly adds, while these experiences are prevalent in the Zen Buddhist tradition, when Nishida introduced the idea of pure experience, he was not specifically referring to these Zen experiences nor was it his intention to explain Zen Buddhism based thereupon. Rather, "pure experience" was introduced within the context of *claiming* that it is the "sole reality." As Ueda says: "[I]n the context of Nishida's thought, [pure experience] develops into "pure experience is the sole reality" (Ueda 1994: 182). This is the result of the level A pure experience becoming aware of itself [*jikaku*] as the sole reality."[9] In other words, for Nishida, level A is coupled with the reflective level B insofar as the latter is the *jikaku* of the former. At this point, Ueda emphasizes that one should not think that what is expressed in B is a judgment *about* pure experience: "Since pure experience cannot be any object to begin with, this is not established as an object-judgment" (Ueda 1994: 182). Rather, the statement "pure experience is the sole reality" should be understood as describing pure experience as articulating itself. To employ Nishida's expression from the *Inquiry*, it describes the "self-development of pure experience" (*junsuikeiken no jihatsujiten* 純粋経験の自発自展). Perhaps, one way of understanding the difference is by asking what is the ground of the claim that "pure experience is the sole reality". According to one possible reading, the ground lies in the judging self who unifies the subject and the predicate terms. However, this would involve making pure experience into a kind of object that can be variously predicated. Furthermore, the subject and predicate terms would rely on the judging self for its unification. An alternative reading suggests that the ground of the judgment lies in the very experience of pure experience, which affords the possibility of being articulated into various judgments. It is this reading that allows us to understand the reflective level B as an internal development, rather than an external imposition of the experiential level A.

[9] The original reads: 「しかし西田のコンテクストのうちでは『純粋経験が唯一の実在である』に展開している。これは(a)の純粋経験そのものが唯一の実在として自ら自覚したものである。」.

Ueda calls the expression at level B the "original phrase" (*konponku*, 根本句, *Ur-satz*) and finds the equivalent in the Zen Buddhist tradition (Ueda 1994: 183. See also Ueda 1991: 237). For example, when it is said that the "flower is red in itself, water flows tranquilly in itself" (*hanawa onozukara kurenai mizuwa onozukara bōbō* 花自紅水自茫茫), Ueda asserts that such phrases in Zen Buddhism are not merely descriptive of flowers and water. Rather, they express the true nature of reality in general. "Original phrases", according to Ueda, are self-sufficient and have the character of expressing and encompassing the whole of reality in a single, often simple phrase.

However, B is not yet the level of philosophical discourse. The aim of philosophy is not to provide a simple phrase that expresses everything in one go. Although it often does seek something like an original phrase, philosophy seeks this *as the basic principle* (*daiichi genri* 第一原理, *Grundsatz*) from which the rest of reality is derived, explained, or contextualized. When Nishida states that "I would like to explain everything on the basis of pure experience as the sole reality," this is where we find him articulating his aspiration for the C level. In fact, on Ueda's account this is the level unique to philosophical thinking. Furthermore, such statements suggest that Nishida understood philosophy as the all-encompassing science that seeks the fundamental principle(s) from which the interrelations between various positions are worked out.

Together, Ueda calls these three levels the "A-B-C interrelation" (A-B-C *renkan* 連関). He notes that the direction from A to B has been taken up by Zen practitioners and, accordingly, is prevalent in the Zen Buddhist tradition. Non-dual experience has given rise to various expressions whereby the experience is articulated and further reflected upon. However, according to Ueda, the step from B to C has not been taken up in the tradition. To begin with, Zen has always despised providing explanations. More specifically, it has not been interested in giving explanations of everything in the specific sense that Nishida has in mind here. Namely, the task in question is not so much to grasp the entirety of reality in one saying as Zen would have it, but to provide the framework from which everything is given its particular place and meaning. This task has not been seen in the province of Zen Buddhism. Indeed, there is an insurmountable chasm between B and C from the perspective of A. Ueda conjectures that Nishida was able to take this step from B to C because of his unique position as both a philosopher and a Zen practitioner.

The other direction from C to B is a way of taking the basic principle back to its origin. According to Ueda, this step is observable in the history of western philosophy as, for example, when the concept of being was interpreted *vis-à-vis* God as *causa sui*. It is interesting that he further notes that we can also see this in the history of modern Japanese philosophy and refers to Tanabe Hajime, a colleague and critic of Nishida, as an example. In his essay, "A Personal Philosophical Reflection on *Shōbōgenzō*," Tanabe sets himself the task of extracting what is significant for contemporary philosophy from Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō*. Ueda observes that such an undertaking is a way of articulating what is given at the level of B and bringing it out to the level of C. However, according to Ueda, Tanabe did not further his step towards the level of A. Accordingly it remains an interpretation of the *Shōbōgenzō*

from the philosophical standpoint *without the accompanying experience regarding the content of the religious text*. We may say that it is a rationalization of experience from without rather than an articulation of experience from within.

Just as there was a huge chasm between C and B from the perspective of A, Ueda argues that there is also a huge chasm between B and A. From the perspective of C, even the idea that there is something beyond B, namely that which is beyond words, is simply unimaginable. Tanabe could not deepen his analysis to the level of A because in his eyes there simply is no extra step after B. Ueda goes as far as to claim that it may not be an exaggeration to say that this step from B to A was initiated for the first time in the history of philosophy by Nishida, again due to his unique position as a philosopher and Zen practitioner.

What is distinctive about Nishida's philosophical position, then, is that it is a dynamic interplay of the three levels. On the one hand, we find Nishida attempting to articulate "pure experience" in a philosophical way. This is the direction from the non-reflective to the reflective. And this is Nishida philosophizing as a Zen practitioner, as Ueda would put it. On the other hand, he proceeds from the level of the higher-order reflection back to experience in order to ground philosophical knowledge in non-reflective experience. This is Nishida the philosopher practicing Zen. Nishida's "philosophy of pure experience" is therefore an attempt to dynamically bring together the three qualitatively distinct levels.

Ueda's characterization of Nishida as "a Zen practitioner philosophizing and a philosopher practicing Zen" encapsulates what he took to be truly unique about Nishida. In a letter to Nishitani Keiji later in his life, Nishida replies affirmatively to Nishitani's comment that "there is something Zen-like behind Prof. Nishida's thought." After describing the core of Zen as grasping reality in truth (*shin no genjitsu haaku* 真の現実把握), Nishida proclaims that it has been his aspiration since his thirties to combine Zen and philosophy (as practiced in the West). Interestingly, he qualifies this as an "impossible" task.[10] According to Ueda, such a remark is not exaggerated. In his eyes, Zen's encounter with western philosophy is comparable to Christianity's encounter with Greek philosophy. Just as the latter event was not merely a historical event that occurred at a particular time in the past but has had a long-lasting influence on western culture until today, Ueda sees Zen's encounter with western philosophy as having an equally influential impact. Seen in this light, Nishida's philosophy as a whole (insofar as his struggle to bring together Zen and philosophy was lifelong) has a great deal to offer the world we live in today insofar as we are still struggling to bring the East and West into dialogue.

In the above, we considered Ueda's analyses of Nishida's position in the *Inquiry* in terms of the A-B-C interrelation. After basing his analysis on the *Inquiry*, Ueda goes on to further generalize the A-B-C interrelation. As we have seen, the statement "pure experience is the sole reality" (level B) was the articulation of the very experience of "pure experience" (level A). As such, it expresses the *jikaku* of "pure

[10] Quoted in Ueda (1991: 223). The original letter is dated February 1943, 2 years before Nishida passed away.

experience" in the sense that the meaning expressed in those words are the *self-realization* (another meaning of *jikaku*) of "pure experience." Accordingly, Ueda generalizes level B as the level of *jikaku*. Based on this reasoning, he reformulates levels A and C. Namely, since level A is the original experience from which *jikaku* arises, it is called *kaku* or realization (not yet *self*-realization but the simple experience of realization) as the origin of *jikaku*. Thus, level C, Nishida's proclamation that he wants to "explain everything on the basis of pure experience as the sole reality," is reformulated as the level where one attempts to understand the world (namely, "everything") and the self insofar as world-understanding is simultaneously the understanding of the self *qua* being-in-the-world. Accordingly, the A-B-C interrelation is reformulated into the following tripartite structure: *Kaku* – *jikaku* – self-world understanding.

In light of this distinction, Ueda restates that in the *Inquiry*, Nishida had attempted a self-world understanding by way of "explanation" ("I would like to explain....") (Ueda 1991: 251). And the principle driving the explanation came from the *jikaku* (i.e., the self-realization) of *kaku* (i.e., the experience of realization).

On this issue there are two points that Ueda mentions that are especially worth highlighting. Firstly, while *jikaku* is said to be the middle point between the experience prior to the subject-object split and the higher-order level of understanding, Ueda also calls the whole dynamic tripartite structure itself "*jikaku*." The former is referred to as the narrow sense of *jikaku*. This is an interesting interpretation insofar as it gives *jikaku*, namely self-awareness and self-realization, the most pivotal role in Nishida's philosophy. Put differently, by calling the whole dynamic structure *jikaku*, Ueda is interpreting Nishida's entire philosophy on the basis of *jikaku*. It should be noted that I am not suggesting that Ueda takes Nishida's philosophical position of *jikaku*, extensively articulated in *Intuition and Reflection in Self-awareness* (1917), as the pinnacle of Nishida's philosophy. There is an important distinction to be made between Nishida's philosophical position of *jikaku*, which was akin to Fichte's transcendental position, and the notion of *jikaku* that came to express the dynamic structure of reflection, which was later succinctly formulated as "the self mirroring itself within itself" (*jiko ga jiko ni oite jiko o utsusu* 自己が自己に於て自己を**写**す). While Nishida gives up his philosophical position of *jikaku* by the 1920s, the idea of a dynamic structure of reflection *qua jikaku* remains central even in the 1930s and 40s. When Ueda interprets Nishida's philosophy based on *jikaku*, he is referring to *jikaku* in the sense of the dynamic structure of reflection. Nevertheless, while Nishida emphasized the "place" of *jikaku* that is implied in the above formulation of *jikaku,* namely the *within* (*ni oite* に於て) of "the self mirrors itself within itself", Ueda wanted to emphasize the dynamism implied in (the place of) *jikaku*. While subtle, Ueda's preference is clear from his choice of calling the whole dynamic structure "*jikaku*" rather than "place." For Ueda, the deepening and expansion of self-awareness are the two moments of *jikaku,* which allow different places to open up for us. Although *jikaku* and place are co- dependent concepts in Nishida's philosophy, and while Ueda also sees the importance of the notion of place, Ueda underscores the dynamism that is implied in the notion of *jikaku*.

The second important point that Ueda mentions in this context is his unique understanding of philosophical reflection as it figures in Nishida's philosophy. As we have seen, level C, or the level of self-world understanding, was the level unique to philosophical thinking. According to Ueda, if we understand *jikaku* as the middle point of *kaku* and self-world understanding, then *jikaku* is the dynamic movement that, on the one hand, *deepens* itself through the experience of *kaku* while, on the other hand, *expands* itself through developing the understanding of the self and the world. As such, philosophical reflection is the development and expansion of *jikaku* in the narrow sense.

Returning to our discussion in the previous section where we examined the two models of reflection, we can now clearly state what is distinct about Nishida's conception of philosophical reflection. If we understand reflection under the first model whereby the self returns to itself in a self-sufficient manner, then philosophical reflection, which is a higher-level form of reflection, essentially becomes a matter of articulating the nature of the self that is firmly settled at the center of all understanding. As we see in Descartes' case, the existence of the world comes only after the self is secured regarding its central place in philosophical reflection.

However, if we understand reflection under the second model, which essentially includes the moment of self-negation (i.e., that knows its origin in selfless experience), then the nature of philosophical reflection starts looking very different. Since reflection *qua jikaku* involves reality or the world in the sense that being self-aware in the sense of *jikaku* means that the self is aware of itself by selflessly being disclosed to reality, what we called philosophical *jikaku* (or higher-order *jikaku*) is essentially a matter of understanding the interconnectedness of self and world. This is why Ueda could claim that level C or self-world understanding is nothing but the development and expansion of *jikaku*. Therefore, it is only natural that Nishida's philosophical understanding of the self and the world has significant differences from most western philosophy, which practices the first model of reflection. Furthermore, since there is no way that one can somehow *prove* that one model of reflection is superior to the other (after all they are just two directions our thought can take, as Ueda rightly notes), any attempt to dismiss Nishida's philosophy on methodological grounds must at the very least appreciate the difference between his model of reflection and the traditional model. Only then can we start critically assessing Nishida's philosophy.

4 Philosophical *jikaku* as a Radicalized Form of Transcendental Reflection

In the above, we considered Ueda's analysis of reflection and philosophical reflection as they figure in Nishida's philosophy. And in doing so, we saw how Ueda underlines the uniqueness of Nishida's position *vis-à-vis* more traditional positions of western philosophy. At this point, one may be left with the impression that

Nishida's view on philosophical reflection has very little in common with the more traditional kind. After all, Ueda's main point was that Nishida operates with a different model of reflection altogether. However, despite Ueda's emphasis on the discontinuity between Nishida's philosophy and western philosophy, there is an important *continuity* worth highlighting that I believe would allow us to better appreciate the significance of Nishida's philosophy in the context of world philosophy.

The continuity I have in mind here is that between Nishida's philosophy and the transcendental tradition since Kant. It is relatively well-known that immediately following the *Inquiry*, Nishida spent much time revising his position by critically engaging with neo-Kantianism as well as Fichte's philosophy. What is less known is that an important part of that engagement involved Nishida critically appropriating the transcendental method (Ishihara 2016). Rather than entering into the details of this engagement, what I wish to do in the following is to argue that Ueda in fact provides us with a case that speaks in favor of this appropriation. More specifically, I show how Ueda's analysis suggests that Nishida's view of philosophical reflection is not merely an alternative to western conceptions of philosophical reflection, but is a radicalized form of transcendental reflection. Such a reading not only allows us to better appreciate the significance of Nishida's philosophy, but also, sheds light on the nature of transcendental reflection, and more generally, the nature of transcendental ways of thinking.

In the context of explaining the two models of reflection, Ueda (2000: 167) explicitly refers to transcendental philosophy as an exemplar of the first model of reflection. In the first model, the reflective "I" goes back to the initial experience and interprets it as that which is only possible on the basis of this I. In other words, experience —including pre-reflective experience— is said to be constituted by the reflecting "I." According to this understanding of reflection, there is no experience without the self. We can certainly say that Kant's transcendental ego serves the role of this higher-order self insofar as it is the condition of possibility for synthetic a priori knowledge. Indeed, Kant's Copernican revolution showed that knowledge of objects is possible because transcendental subjectivity plays the central role in cognition, not the existence of objects, as was traditionally thought.

Since Ueda identifies traditional forms of transcendental philosophy as working with the first model of reflection and contrasts this to the second model exemplified in Nishida's philosophy, it may seem that Ueda is suggesting that Nishida's conception of philosophical *jikaku* is in essence a *non-transcendental* kind of reflection. But the following passage seems to suggest the contrary:

> Instead of beginning with reflection and proceeding transcendentally to a higher-order reflection ("reflection of reflection"), Nishida goes the other way around in "taking a step back by turning the light in upon oneself" [*ekōhenshō no taiho*, 回光返照の退歩]. First, the rupture of reflection [*hansei no yabure*] is experienced which then gives rise to the awareness of the limits of reflection. Then, through such awareness [*jikaku*] of its limits, the limits are permeated and the space of reflection expands to the pre-reflective by way of returning

> to its origin. From there it proceeds to reflection and then on to reflection of reflection (now having the function of transcendental reflection). (Ueda 1991: 368 [emphasis added])[11]

Let us try to untangle this dense passage in light of our earlier discussion. Unlike more traditional forms of philosophical reflection in the West, Nishida's philosophical *jikaku* begins with the "rupture of reflection" (that is, the experience of "*kaku*"). Reflection that arises from such experience is qualitatively different from the kind that is oblivious to this origin since in the latter case, the reflective "I" immediately takes center stage and interprets itself to be the origin of itself. Rather than simply starting with the reflective "I," Nishida begins with the experience of *kaku*. And when reflection arises from such *kaku*, namely when *jikaku* occurs, such reflection expands its "space of reflection" to encompass the pre-reflective realm as both its limits and origin. Philosophical *jikaku*, then, is the higher-order reflection that further expands this space of reflection toward the understanding of the self and the world with the understanding of its limits and origin.

But what does Ueda mean when he says that this higher-order reflection has the function of transcendental reflection? How could this be when Ueda identifies transcendental philosophy as an exemplar of the kind of philosophy that is based on the first model of reflection? I believe we can make sense of this if we understand what Ueda calls transcendental reflection in the following way. Namely, as *a higher-order reflection that seeks the conditions of possibility for our knowledge and, more generally, our experience.* Note that this way of formulating the nature of transcendental reflection makes no immediate reference to "the self" or "subjectivity." Historically, as we see in Kant and the German idealist tradition, transcendental reflection was a way of articulating the structures of transcendental subjectivity. However, we can question whether this is a necessary consequence of transcendental reflection. Ueda's distinction between the two models of reflection allows us to see that it was merely a consequence of the model of reflection they were working with. Put differently, our understanding of the nature of transcendental reflection is contingent on how one understands the nature of reflection.

Under the first model, transcendental reflection seeks the conditions of possibility for our knowledge and experience in the structures of transcendental subjectivity because, according to this model, higher-order reflection is the heightened form of reflection centered around the reflective "I." This is what we find in Kant and the western transcendental tradition. But, under the second model, higher-order reflection seeks the conditions of possibility for our knowledge and experience *not* in any transcendental subjectivity, because that would already be at the level of reflection and would fall short of articulating the origin of reflection. Rather, transcendental reflection, in this picture, must go further and seek the conditions of possibility for our knowledge and experience in the non-reflective, selfless experience from which

[11] "*Ekōhenshō*" (回光返照) is a phrase that appears in the Zen Buddhist text, *The Record of Linji* (*Rinzairoku*). The meaning of the phrase is: "turning the light in upon myself." Sasaki explains that "[t]he phrase may be said to describe the essence of Buddhist meditation – to take the mind, ordinarily occupied entirely with discursive thought and external phenomena, and direct it inward toward the source of the mind's activities" (Sasaki 2009: 266).

the reflective "I" arises in the first place. Accordingly, in the above quote, Ueda seems to be suggesting that Nishida is working with this latter kind of transcendental reflection insofar as Nishida's philosophical *jikaku* finds the ground of our knowledge and experience in the experience of *kaku*.

Understood in this way, we can see how Nishida could be said to be operating with a kind of transcendental reflection. But the question remains: how could we say that Nishida's philosophical *jikaku* is a *radicalized* form of traditional transcendental reflection? Since the two models of reflection are two alternative models that cannot be proven wrong from either perspective, how can we say that a higher-order form of reflection is a radicalization of the higher-order form of the other?

While it is true that the two models are equally valid ways of understanding the nature of reflection, Ueda clearly shows his preference when it comes to the discussion on the nature of philosophical reflection. Returning to the *Inquiry*, which Ueda takes to be the quintessence of Nishida's philosophy (not in the sense that he thinks that it is the most clearly articulated work, but in the sense that it contains the core of Nishida's whole philosophy), he notes that there are two "beginnings" in the work. Or put differently, he says that "'the philosophy of pure experience' *begins twice*" (Ueda 1991: 367). One of the beginnings is found in Part 2: Reality where Nishida identifies, through a kind of Cartesian doubt, "the starting point of his inquiry" (which is the title of Chapter 1) in the indubitable fact of direct experience. Subsequently, he says that conscious phenomena, which in this context refers to nothing other than direct or pure experience, is the sole reality. This is the *philosophical beginning* that is articulated as a result of reflecting on the starting point of philosophical inquiry. But there is also another starting point that is announced at the very beginning of the book, Part 1: Pure Experience (Chapter 1: Pure Experience), in the description of pure experience or what Ueda calls "*kaku*." This is the *non-reflective beginning* that comes *before* reflection. It is the "beginning of the beginning" (Ueda 1991: 368). And, compared to the other beginning, which is presented by way of reflection, this beginning is announced abruptly and inevitably so because of its non-reflective nature. For the very event of pure experience, as we have stressed earlier in this paper, does not and cannot present itself through reflection but can only be presented in direct encounter with such experience. Many readers of the *Inquiry* stumble at the outset because *this* beginning is presented on the first page prior to any introduction of the context. What is interesting is that in the Preface, Nishida suggests to anyone reading the book for the first time to skip Part 1. Ueda notes that this was probably because Nishida anticipated the difficulty of understanding and appreciating what was being presented there.

As we have already seen in Ueda's tripartite analysis of the *Inquiry*, the philosophical beginning in Nishida's philosophy is ultimately made possible by its non-reflective starting point. Although such a philosophical beginning is certainly not necessary, Ueda claims that, "[s]o long as philosophy is a reflective discipline, taking reflection back to the pre-reflective is a form of radical reflection" (Ueda 1991: 368 [emphasis added]). And he continues: "Furthermore, the pre-reflective is originally the most direct. Thus taking reflection back to the pre-reflective is radicalizing reflection, but also, it is the recovery of the most direct." The radicality of such

reflection is further underlined when Ueda otherwise speaks of "the suspension of reflection" (*hanseiteishi* 反省停止). Comparing this to the phenomenological *epoché*, he says that the suspension of reflection is much more far-reaching: "While the suspension of judgment is a specific method of philosophical reflection, the suspension of reflection is a way of reflecting on the practice of philosophy itself" (USS, 2: 210–211). For Husserl, the phenomenological *epoché* was a procedure of "bracketing," or putting our general belief in the existence of the external world out of play in order to secure the field proper to phenomenology, i.e., phenomena as they present themselves to us. It is a radical method insofar as such bracketing brings out our unquestioned belief in the acceptance of the world, which is otherwise covered up in our natural ways of relating to the world. But however radical this may be, it still remains within the province of reflection since the phenomenological *epoché* is, as Ueda says, a specific method of phenomenological reflection.

The suspension of reflection, in contrast, radically questions the belief in reflection. It questions whether beginning with the reflective "I" is the only possible beginning for philosophical inquiry into reality. Of course, to the extent that philosophy is a reflective endeavor, it must begin with reflection. However, as we saw, reflection can take two directions. One direction interprets pre-reflective experience from the perspective of the reflective "I" and claims that reflection is a way of articulating the implicit "I" in experience prior to reflection. The other direction comes out of an acknowledgement that pre-reflective experience is the selfless origin from which reflection arises together with the subject-object dichotomy. In the latter case, the higher-order "I" does not heighten the reflective "I," but rather, it proceeds to "cancel" (*kesu* 消す) the "I" that seems to be there in the initial experience. As Ueda says: "It is not that 'I see' the 'seeing I' [in a linear higher-order way], but rather, it is an effort of canceling the 'I' of the 'seeing I' into the thing that is being seen" (USS, 2: 211).

Let us dwell for a moment on this idea of "cancelling the 'I' into (or towards) the thing" or making the "I" disappear into the thing. In our experience of, say, seeing a flower, one can take the flower as an object standing opposed to oneself. In doing so, we tend to forget that this was due to an act of making the flower into an object, i.e. that it was a result of a positing act that grasped the flower as an object. If our experience of the flower as object was an effect of our performance, then what would happen if we could refrain from such action and instead let the thing simply reveal itself to us? This is what Ueda is suggesting when he says, "go into the thing" (*mono ni hairu* 物に入る). Here, "thing", or *mono* (物, もの), does not denote the thing that has become the object (*kyakutai* 客体; *taishō* 対象) of our awareness. Rather, Ueda has in mind what the poet Matsuo Bashō says in the context of explicating what he takes to be the essence of good haiku: "Go into the thing and its minuteness manifests."[12] For Bashō, good haiku is born from an elimination of one's subjective coloring of experience. When haiku is composed from the subject's perspective of seeing the "thing" as an object, namely when "the self and thing are

[12] The reference is from *Sanzōshi* (Three Color Notebooks). Quoted in (USS, 2: 217).

two [and not one],” such composition remains far from “good haiku” that arises from one’s complete absorption into the thing. Nishitani Keiji, in an essay titled “The Standpoint of Śūnyatā,” also refers to Bashō’s famous line, “From the pine tree learn of the pine tree; and from the bamboo of the bamboo” (Nishitani 1982: 128). Nishitani explains that Bashō is not suggesting that we observe the pine tree more carefully or much less to analyze it scientifically. Rather, “[h]e means for us to enter into the mode of being where the pine tree is the pine tree itself, and the bamboo is the bamboo itself, and from there to look at the pine tree and the bamboo” (Nishitani 1982: 128). Taking a hint from the Buddhist notion of *samādhi* (or “settling”; 定) as the state of mind of pure, selfless concentration on a thing, Nishitani characterizes the mode of being of things in their “selfness” (i.e. as they are in themselves, *jitaisei* 自体性), as *jyōzai* (定在) or “samadhi-being.” It is the mode of being of things as they are “settled into their own positions.” According to Nishitani, the samadhi-being of things only manifests in the standpoint of Śūnyatā (or emptiness), namely the standpoint whereby the ego has given way its central position to the things themselves. Not surprisingly, we also find a similar characterization of the “thing” in Nishida’s thought. In his later period, he often spoke of “seeing as the thing [*mono*], acting as the thing [*mono*]” or “seeing by becoming the thing, acting by becoming the thing” (*monotonatte mi, monotonatte okonau* 物となって見、物となって行う). This is the kind of seeing and acting that is actualized when the subject loses itself into the thing and the subject-object split is no longer there, as in the case of learning from the pine tree. And in the *Inquiry*, he says: “To say that we know a thing simply means that the self unites with it. When one sees a flower, the self has become the flower” (Nishida 1978, 1990: 77).

Now, returning to our earlier discussion, according to Ueda, suspension of reflection prepares one to encounter experience in this selfless manner where we are at once disclosed to “the realization of reality,” to use Nishitani Keiji’s phrase once again. But what must be emphasized, he continues, is that such suspension of reflection is not equivalent to the actual experience of “going into the thing”, or what he also calls “presencing to the presence.” The suspension of reflection merely *prepares* one to encounter such reality. Perhaps, we could compare the distance between the two with the distance between the phenomenological *epoché* and the phenomenological reduction. The *epoché* is a negative procedure of suspending judgment, which must be subsequently complemented by the reduction, which, by contrast, is positive insofar as it is the procedure of “going back” to the field that has opened by the *epoché*. Similarly, we can say that the suspension of reflection is a negative procedure of putting the action of reflection out of play. Such negation, however, must be accompanied by the positive practice of actually letting oneself be disclosed to the selfless presence of the things themselves. Yet, the analogy stops there because the phenomenological *epoché* and reduction are both methods of phenomenological reflection. By contrast, while the suspension of reflection remains a method of philosophical reflection, the presencing to the presence is that which is by its nature non-reflective and hence is prior to or beyond reflection. In this sense, the distance between the suspension of reflection and the actual presencing to the presence is much greater than that between the phenomenological *epoché* and the reduction.

Let us now return to our question: In what sense is Nishida's, and effectively Ueda's, philosophical *jikaku* a *radicalized* form of traditional transcendental reflection? Put differently, why is seeking the conditions of possibility for our knowledge and experience in the non-reflective, selfless experience *more radical* than seeking them in the structures of transcendental subjectivity? From the above, we can say that the answer to this question lies in Nishida's and Ueda's resolute determination to take philosophical reflection back to its origin, i.e. to return to the very beginning of philosophical inquiry. As we saw in Ueda's analysis of Nishida's *Inquiry*, philosophy begins twice for Nishida. It was the beginning with non-reflective, awakened experience, that allowed him to ultimately identify the conditions of possibility for knowledge and experience with the selfless encounter with reality. Such reflection, namely reflection on the non-reflective, is radical insofar as reflection cannot reach the non-reflective without breaking from itself. And yet, once non-reflective experience is disclosed through the "rupture of reflection" as the ground of reality, then the space of reflection expands to the non-reflective and philosophical reflection takes this as the "beginning of the beginning."

The radicality of such reflection was also underlined by the somewhat paradoxical idea of the suspension of reflection that Ueda introduced. It is paradoxical as a philosophical method since it demands that one radically questions the very philosophical tool at one's disposal. And yet, it is this paradoxical nature of the method that puts us in a position to better appreciate the origin of reflection. Carrying out such a method, although not the same as actually having the selfless experience, nonetheless prepares one for such an encounter. In this sense, it may be the most one could expect from a philosophical method that inquires into the origin of itself.

5 Conclusion

In the Introduction, we briefly touched on the ordinary Japanese meaning of *jikaku* as connoting a kind of self-understanding gained through a disclosure of one's place. In Japanese it is also common to speak of "the deepening of one's *jikaku*" (*jikaku ga fukamaru* 自覚が**深**まる). According to Ueda, such language reflects the fact that one's *jikaku* is related to the deepening of the world one finds oneself in (Ueda 1991: 315). As an illustration, Ueda mentions how the very same act can have different meanings depending on what kind of place or world one finds oneself in. For example, if a person who has committed a robbery finds himself in the "world of law", he can atone for his crime by way of a legal penalty. But if his *jikaku* deepens to the "world of morality," the subject must transform himself internally, rather than through external compensation, to face what he has done. And furthermore, if the person's *jikaku* has deepened to the "world of religion," then even the idea of owning something for one's own sake is already sinful. Nishida's basic insight, which Ueda further develops, is this idea that we can have various kinds as well as various levels of *jikaku*

depending on what kind of place one finds oneself in and how one relates to this place. As human beings, we dwell in a plurality of places, each place providing one with a sense of identity and belongingness. And sometimes we may find ourselves more open to a place and more closed to another. In this way, our way of being is defined by our relatedness to our places. But what marks Nishida's and Ueda's true insight is the idea that ultimately, our *jikaku* is twofold.[13] Underlying all of our finite *jikaku* as, say, a parent, a scholar, a Japanese person, etc. is the *jikaku* of oneself as selfless and no-thing, or what Nishida calls "*jikaku* as absolute nothingness" (*zettaimu no jikaku* 絶対無の自覚). In Ueda's words: "[T]he self, by being in a place, is also, simultaneously, within the infinite openness (*mugen no hirake* 無限の開け). And I am open to 'the infinite openness' as 'selfless'" (Ueda 1991: 322).

For both Nishida and Ueda, then, one's *jikaku* must ultimately deepen to the understanding of oneself as selfless and infinitely open to one's place if we are to follow through with the deepening of *jikaku*. As philosophers, however, what is essential is not to simply have such *jikaku* but to grasp and articulate the nature of *jikaku* and, accordingly, of the world (since *jikaku* is correlated to world-understanding) in its twofold structure. So if we were to ask, "what is the nature of Nishida and Ueda's *jikaku* as a philosopher?" we could answer by saying that the nature of their philosophical *jikaku* is to grasp and conceptually articulate the twofold structure of our *jikaku* and our world *internally*, that is, by awakening to such twofold nature ourselves. As Ueda says, to philosophize is "to execute *jikaku* in a self-aware [*jikaku-teki*] manner" (*jikaku no jikakuteki suikō* 自覚の自覚的遂行) (Ueda 1991: 364). As Ueda emphasizes, such a task is not at all easy and this is what makes Nishida's philosophy so difficult to understand. It is not that Nishida spuriously tried to blur the boundary between philosophy and religion. Rather, the difficulty is a result of the sincere attitude of a rigorous philosopher wanting to provide a comprehensive explanation of the entirety of reality from the most direct, fundamental standpoint. As Nishida says in one of his later writings: "Since *An Inquiry into the Good*, it has been my aim to see things and to think things from the most direct and most fundamental standpoint. It has been to grasp the standpoint wherefrom everything arises and whereto everything returns" (Nishida 1979: 3).

[13] Nishida presents *basho* with a three-fold structure, which corresponds to the structure of *jikaku*: *basho* of being (*u no basho* 有の場所), *basho* of relative nothingness (*sōtaimu no basho* 相対無の場所), and *basho* of absolute nothingness (*zettaimu no basho* 絶対無の場所). This tripartite division provides a slightly more nuanced version than Ueda's idea of the "twofoldbeing-in-the-the-world" (*nijūsekainaisonzai* 二重世界内存在), which states that as being-in-the-world ("world" here means the comprehensive space of meaning), we are simultaneously within the hollow expanse (*kokū* 虚空). I am here following Ueda's concise version of the twofold structure of *jikaku*, which I believe is a condensed version of Nishida's tripartite structure of *basho* and *jikaku*.

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